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Abstract
Building on the literature of dynamic capability and organizational learning, we examine
strategy execution in hyper-competition as a problem of how organizations can re-configure
their learning capability to match with their radically different learning demands.
Organizations in hyper-competitive environments face an increasing gap between their
learning opportunities and needs, and actual learning performance. In order to survive they
must improve their absorptive capacity so that they can learn simultaneously broad, deep and
fast. We define such a learning contingency as hyper-learning. To do so, the organization
must systematically interlace explorationâthat seeks to maximize learning breadthâ and
exploitationâthat seeks to maximize learning depth. Unlike in traditional learning cycles,
exploration and exploitation during periods of hyper-learning are not insulated from each
other through time or structure. We explore seven software firms engaged in Web system
development during the hey-day on dot.com frenzy and investigate how these companies
were able to hyper-learn. We distinguish two mechanisms to speed up exploration:
distributed gate-keeping and extended grafting of external knowledge; and two mechanisms
to speed up exploitation: simple design patterns and peer networks. These mechanisms were
nearly uniformly recognized in all studied organizations. We also examine the systemic
configuration and patterning of these activities, which enables organizations to learn in high
gear. This organizational learning model is contrasted with the punctuated equilibrium model
of learning articulated in mainstream strategy research. Finally some implications for future
research and management practice are drawn.
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Learning in High Gear: Hyper-learning and Dynamic Capability 
 in Seven Software Firms 
 
Introduction 
In today’s hyper-competitive business environment (D'aveni 1994), a company’s ability 
to quickly learn and adapt to the changing environments is  key to its  success and survival 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Grant 1996, Ilinirtch et al. 1996, Volberda 1996).  In such an 
environment, traditional strategies that seek sustainable, competitive advantage in the long-term 
(Barney 1996, Chandler 1962, Penrose 1959, Porter 1980) are being challenged by 
Schumpeterian creative destruction (Schumpeter 1934, Young et al. 1996) and hyper-
competition (D'aveni 1994).  It is no longer sufficient to jockey into a unique position in an 
industry (Chandler 1962, Porter 1980) or to possess a configuration of difficult-to-imitate 
bundles of resources or routines that guarantee competitive advantage (Barney 1996, Nelson and 
Winter 1982, Penrose 1959, Peteraf 1993, Wernerfelt 1984).  Strategic frameworks based on 
hyper-competition expect continuous and disruptive organizational innovation that continuously 
creates temporary disequilibria in the competitive system (Volberda 1996).   
To date, research on hyper-competition has focused on the nature and structure of hyper-
competitive marketplaces (D'aveni 1994) and has consisted of company-level studies that 
explore companies’ strategies through high velocity decision-making and the creation of new 
competences (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  What is striking in the 
existing research is the scant attention paid to hyper-competitive strategy execution or how 
organizations in high-velocity environments manage to rapidly acquire new competencies.  This 
acquisition of new knowledge represents learning by the organization (D'aveni 1994), or rather 
the organization’s learning to learn.  Through this learning to learn process, the organization 
creates capabilities in order to acquire new capabilities (dynamic capability).  A focus on 
strategy execution would enable the observation of micro-level learning processes whereby 
organizations foster learning.  Through these processes, firms subsequently build up pools of 
resources and routines that either inhibit or foster the creation of dynamic capability. 
Building on the literature of dynamic capability and organizational learning (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995), we examine strategy 
execution that takes place during hyper-competition.  The objective is to understand how 
organizations re-configure their learning capability in order to radically match the new learning 
demands posed by hyper-competition.  A primary assumption of this paper is that, during hyper-
competition, organizations face an increasing gap between their learning opportunities and needs 
and actual learning performance.   In order to survive and thrive in hypercompetitive situations, 
organizations must dramatically increase their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) 
so that they are capable of hyper-learning.  
We define hyper-learning as an organizational contingency where an organization must 
concurrently learn (a) broadly, (b) deeply and (c) quickly.  Traditional views of organizational 
learning indicated that firms sought to learn in cycles of exploration (March 1991), which  aims  
to maximize learning breadth and exploitation  (March 1991), which  aims to maximize learning 
depth.   In contrast, in hyper-competitive environments, exploitation and exploration become 
inseparable and interlaced.  Hyper-learning is thus characterized by compressed time spans for 
both exploration and exploitation, and a high level of concurrency between these two.  In order 
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to hyper-learn, organizations must find the mechanisms to close the gap between exploration and 
exploitation.  Methods for traditional learning are likely insufficient and how these two end goals 
can be successfully merged in time or structure must be understood by those firms entering a 
period of hyper-competition.   
In order to understand these new processes, the following three research questions are 
examined:  
 
Research Question 1: What are the specific mechanisms of hyper-learning in organizations that 
radically increase the absorptive capacity in hyper-competition? 
Research Question 2: How can such learning mechanisms be configured as core elements of 
dynamic capability?  
Research Question 3: How does hyper-learning affect organizational design and strategy 
execution? 
  
Below, in a replicated case study, the paper examines hyper-learning mechanisms that 
were established in seven software development firms (three in the United States and four in 
Finland) competing in Web development during the peak of the hyper-competitive electronic 
commerce boom (June to December 2000).  This boom was characterized by the following: 
massive infusions of resources; rapid, radical and pervasive changes to the information 
technology base; intense competition between service providers; and unprecedented 
requirements for fast time-to-market delivery.  The objective of this paper is to seek answers to 
the above questions and thus identify the characteristics of hyper-learning in these firms and how 
they changed their organizational processes in order to hyper-learn.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 further develops the 
concept of hyper-competition and hyper-learning and discusses how it sets new demands for 
firms in developing dynamic capability.  Section 3 presents the design of the field study and 
reports key findings concerning hyper-learning mechanisms in the seven software firms.  The 
paper concludes by discussing the implications of the data, specifically, how the findings provide 
insight into the acquisition and deployment of new capabilities during hyper-competition.  
Further, it contrasts these findings with traditional beliefs from the organizational learning, 
dynamic capability, and knowledge management literatures. 
 
Theoretical Background: Dynamic Capability and Hyper-learning 
Hyper-competition and Dynamic Capability 
In the literature, it has been suggested that, in stable competitive environments, 
companies can sustain their competitive position by engaging in extensive and prolonged 
exploitation processes that are only occasionally punctuated by relatively short and disruptive 
discontinuities in markets and technologies (March 1991, Tushman and Anderson 1986).  
Through the exploitation processes, firms seek to garner and refine competencies through 
repeated actions over extended periods of time (Dierickx and Cool 1989, Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000, Nelson and Winter 1982, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), while through explorations they 
search and create new competences (Christensen 1997, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Fredickson 
1984, Henderson and Clark 1990, Imai et al. 1985, Kim 1998, March 1991, Nonaka 1994, Pisano 
1994, Tushman and Anderson 1986, Winter and Szulanski 2001).  In such stable environments, 
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chaotic and ambiguous explorations of technology and knowledge are exceptions and bricolage 
is unrecognized (Ciborra and Lanzara 1994).  
However, recent studies on hyper-competition and dynamic capabilities challenge these 
views (D'aveni 1994, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Teece et al. 1997).  
D’Aveni (1994) defines a hyper-competition as “intense and rapid competitive moves, in which 
competitors must move quickly to build advantages and erode the advantages of their rivals” (p. 
218).  In such high-velocity environments fast change is endemic and it becomes nonlinear and 
less predictable with blurring boundaries and ambiguous market players (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000).  Drawing from Schumpeter (1934), hyper-competition recognizes the relentless and rapid 
pace of innovation among rivals that creates disequilibria in the markets within compressed time 
frames through the use of pre-emptive strategies and rapid swings in market competition as a key 
characteristic of business environments (D'aveni 1994). In hyper-competitive environments, the 
company’s strategic agenda is to increase agility: it must outpace competition by constantly 
exploring and pursuing new sources of competitive advantage. Therefore, in a hyper-competitive 
market, companies engage in a chain of small, easily duplicated strategies that maximize their 
likelihood of survival. Thus, in a hyper-competitive environment, dynamic capability plays a 
vital role in creating competitive advantage.  
Dynamic capability refers to an ability that alters a company’s resource base through 
acquisition, integration, re-combination, and the removal of organizational capabilities 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  It enables companies to relentlessly integrate, reconfigure, gain 
and release resources that create and respond to swift and dramatic changes in competition 
(D'aveni 1994, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Teece et al. 1997).  
Dynamic capability thus embodies a meta-capability by which firms build up new resource 
configurations (Teece et al. 1997) and engage in second-order learning, which ischaracterized by 
a search for alternative routines, rules, technologies and goals (Lant and Mezias 1992).  Dynamic 
capability often results from the realization that specific experiences and opportunities cannot be 
interpreted within the current theory-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1978).   
Together, these concepts offer new theoretical lenses that helps us understand the 
importance of dynamic-capability building that underlies effective hyper-competitive strategy.  
A growing body of the literature has examined decision processes and organizational designs by 
which organizations acquire dynamic capability (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Galunic and 
Eisenhardt 1996, Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001, Henderson and Cockburn 1994, Henderson and 
Clark 1990, Montealegre 2002, Teece et al. 1997).  They suggest a different logic for 
organizational design that underscores the importance of organizing through semi-structures, 
developing simple organizational routines and decision rules and the critical role of experimental 
learning and iterative strategy.   
The impact of squeezing more into less time—a hallmark of hyper-competition— on 
firms’ dynamic capability, however, has not been adequately investigated in the extant literature. 
Furthermore, these studies pay scant attention to strategy execution.  Specifically, little is 
understood as to how organizations in action launch and configure behaviors and specific 
learning processes that enable the creation of dynamic capability.  This invites investigation into 
specific organizational routines and structures as well as the consequent formulation of theories 
and concepts that explain how organizations quickly “learn to learn.”  
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Dynamic Capability and Hyper-learning 
There is a dearth of knowledge regarding what organizations do to dramatically expand 
their capability to learn.   Expansion of the capability to learn requires that firms decide which 
knowledge assets to retain and which ones to purge.  Likewise, little is understood with regard to 
learning under intense time pressures.  While learning under these conditions is not well 
understood, these capabilities could well become a main competitive asset in times of hyper-
competition.  In order to address these gaps in the literature, we propose a notion of hyper-
learning.  
Building on the organizational learning literature (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, March 
1991, Zahra and George 2002), we conceptualize hyper-learning as an organizational attempt to 
radically increase absorptive capacity via simultaneously pursuing  the exploration “of new 
possibilities” and the exploitation “of old certainties” to cope (March 1991) with radically 
compressed time demands of hyper-competition (Figure 1). Simply put, hyper-learning requires 
an organization to learn broadly, deeply, and quickly at the same time. Absorptive capacity can 
be defined as the “ability of a firm to recognize the value of new external (and internal) 
information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990 pp.128).  
Absorptive capacity is a function of an organization’s prior learning and it shows path 
dependencies in cognitive framing (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Thus, a shift to hyper-learning 
often requires deep changes in organizations’ cognitive frames and belief systems, thus calling 


























Figure 1. Pressures Towards Hyper-learning 
 
 
The need to rapidly increase absorptive capacity must thereby address how much an 
organization is proportionally engaged in these activities and when and how they become 
interlinked through communications, knowledge sharing principles, incentives and culture 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  First, in order to increase the breadth of learning, an organization 
must expand quickly in a given time period relative to its resource pool. Moreover, the 
organization faces higher uncertainty as to what topics may be relevant for its future 
competitiveness so the risk of learning something that quickly become irrelevant is high.  
©Sprouts 2(4) pp 160-194, http://sprouts.case.edu/2002/020410.pdf 165
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/2-16
LYYTINEN, ROSE AND YOO/LEARNING IN HIGH GEAR 
 
Second, in order to increase the depth of learning, an organization needs to increase the speed at 
which it replicates its knowledge from one strategic context to another (Winter and Szulanski 
2001).  Moreover, the risk of failing to do so renders the organization vulnerable to higher 
market risks. This unique combination of fast simultaneous exploitation and exploration for 
hyper-learning is clarified further in Table 1 by contrasting it with more traditional forms of 
learning. 
 
Exploitation Needs  










 Cell I: Low-level learning in a 
stable environment 
 
Results in slow change and/or decay in 
organizational capability and change; 
Typical in natural monopolies and 
bureaucracies 
Cell II: Incremental innovation 
through continued exploitation 
 
Results in focusing on exploitation in a 
stable environment to achieve or sustain 
dominant market position; Focus on 
refining rigid core competencies; 
Harnessing specialized capabilities in an 
established area, e.g. oil drilling, or 






















 Cell III: Exploration of 
disruptive business opportunities 
 
High level out-of box learning in a 
dynamic turn-around environment;  
Focus on technology and market 
monitoring and assessment for 
emerging markets to minimize business 
risks; Typical in consulting and the 
research industry 
Cell IV: Hyper-learning  
 
Broad and deep knowledge acquisition and 
utilization with interlaced exploration and 
exploitation cycles in turbulent and hyper-
competitive environments; Focus on fast 
learning as core competence; Typical in 
high technology industries with rapid 
technology changes and emerging markets 
Table 1. Organizational Contingencies for Exploration and Exploitation Needs 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, during hyper-learning (cell IV) the demand for exploration 
increases drastically, while at the same time organizations must radically improve their 
exploitation speed and how they shift between exploration and exploitation.  Such a combination 
is unique to hyper-competition and makes it different from the other organizational learning 
contingencies that have shaped strategic thinking; in these situations, organizational learning is 
seen as a slow dance of organizational focus over time, or through structure, between cells II and 
III. In a stable environment, organizations try to prolong the period of exploitation of the 
dominant design of the current generation technology as their core competence for as long as 
possible (Leonard 1995, Prahalad and Hamel 1990), thereby focusing on cell II, until they face 
technological and environmental uncertainties caused by  the next generation of technology (cell 
III) (Christensen 1997, Tushman and Anderson 1986).  Therefore, stable environment 
exploration (e.g., R&D and new venture) and exploitation (e.g., process improvements and best 
practices) form distinct activities separated by time and structure.  Instead, for organizations 
pursuing hyper-learning (cell IV), exploitation and exploration form dialectics as two opposing 
and separate facets of the same activity that builds up absorptive capacity over time . The core 
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competency is the unique configuration and interlacing of these learning capabilities that allow 
competition based on learning speed in terms of both depth and breadth.    
There has been no prior research in the literature that specifically examines the distinctive 
characteristics of hyper-learning and its outcomes.  In order to begin to address this gap in the 
literature, we conducted an exploratory multi-site case study in which we examined the 
following questions: (a) what are the specific mechanisms of exploitation and exploration that 
are used to radically increase the absorptive capacity (question 1); (b) how are these learning 
mechanisms configured (question 2); and (c) how are the outcomes of hyper-learning reflected in 
their organizational design and strategy execution? By answering these questions, we seek to 





We chose to conduct a multi-site case study (Yin 1994) to address these research 
questions. The value of this type of study is that it allows for a replication logic by which we can 
test emerging theoretical insights that permits us to triangulate both theory and data during the 
research process (Eisenhardt 1989, Strauss and Corbin 1990). We conducted a 7-month field 
study in seven software development firms that develop Web-based systems using emerging 
Internet computing (March et al 2001). Here, “Web-based” systems refer to computing 
applications that utilize Internet browsers, such as Netscape or Microsoft Internet Explorer, and a 
set of open standards and protocols that include XML, HTML, http, URL, TCP/IP, combined 
with the extensive use of middleware1 architectures in leveraging the computing service.  
We identified seven companies that met the following criteria: (1) they were developing 
Web-based systems; (2) they were recognized by their peers as users of the most advanced 
technologies available; and (3) they worked mostly for outside clients through contractual 
relationships. Web-based systems development formed a key strategic technology direction of 
these firms and they were active members of a technology community experimenting with Web-
based technologies.  They were constantly seeking to manage the uncertainty of their leading-
edge technological solutions.   
As the companies were developing software for external customers, they had to also 
simultaneously assess, manage and share business and technology risks with their customers.  As 
a result, these companies were struggling with the challenges of identifying and managing the 
knowledge assets of how to work with the “bleeding edge” technologies and demonstrate their 
value in a business environment. We believe that this environment can be characterized as hyper-
competition. A summary of the firms’ characteristics is included in Table 2. We explore in detail 
the various learning mechanisms that these seven firms used to acquire, integrate, reconfigure 
and purge knowledge assets at an unprecedented speed in order to cope with hyper-competition. 
To minimize potential bias in our study, we sought to maximize the variations in our 
sample. This also served the goal of improving the external validity of the study using the 
replication logic by which the studied phenomena can be generalized into a theory of 
organizational hyper-learning (Yin 1994).  Companies had different sizes and operated in 
different industry sectors in terms of the services provided (ranging from manufacturing, 
                                                 
1  In the computer industry, middleware is a general term for any programming that serves to "glue together" two 
separate and usually already existing programs.  
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financial services and public administration to retail and transportation).  They had experience 
using Web-based technologies in several application domains (back office, front office, and 
inter-organizational applications).  The geographical scope of their operations varied largely as 
some were local software firms while others were part of large global companies.  The firms also 
had large variations in their software development experience, ranging from as few as four years 
to 40+ years.  We also included three firms from the U. S. and four from Finland in order to 
minimize cultural or regional bias. Both countries are known to be leading exploiters of Internet 
technologies. 
The data was gathered primarily through semi-structured interviews with senior 
management and by analyzing archives of the company documents, including systems 
development documentations and technology strategies. We approached the companies and 
requested access to their documents and senior executives and developers who made decisions 
about technology investments and were in charge of strategy. The interviewees thus managed the 
organizational knowledge bases and skills needed to execute a chosen technology and business 
strategy. A range of three to six individuals from each company participated in the study. Each 
interview lasted from one to three hours. The interviews reviewed the applications and solution 
portfolios provided by these companies to their clients and examined how they delivered these 
applications. We probed for changes taking place in the business and the technology domains of 
their operations as a result of Internet computing.  Specifically, we asked the firms to clarify the 
extent, scope, depth and speed of changes in their software development when compared with 
their situation prior to the Web development and to focus particularly on how their mechanisms 
for learning had changed.  We further examined how these firms coped with these changes and 
how they had created dynamic capabilities.  
All interviews took place between June and December 2000 and were tape recorded with 
the permission of the firms.  The interviews were transcribed and the summaries of these 
transcripts were sent to the companies for correction and validation.  Additional notes were made 
during the visits concerning physical sites, personnel age, general atmosphere etc. We also 
collected written materials from these companies, including their annual reports, Web sites, 
advertising materials, manuals, and system handbooks. A summary of firms and their 
characteristics is represented in Table 2. 
Data analysis was done using the traditional inductive method (Boyatzis 1998, Glasser 
and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Corbin 1990). The transcript of each company was subject to a 
within-case analysis that involved repeatedly reading the transcript and taking thorough notes 
about firms’ perceptions of the competitive environments and their reactions to the 
environmental changes and the need to create dynamic capabilities. After each individual case 
had been analyzed, we began cross-case comparisons that involved listing the similarities and 
differences among the firms we studied.  The results of the cross-case comparisons provide a 
vivid picture of the hyper-competitive environments that these firms were facing along with the 
learning challenges.  Furthermore, the results provide a consistent picture of how these firms 
developed various learning mechanisms in order to simultaneously speed up exploitation and 
exploration and how they configured them to radically increase their absorptive capacity. The 
main findings are summarized in Table 3.   
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Hyper-learning in Web-based Development Organizations 
 
Web-based System Developments as a Hyper-Competitive Environment 
The emergence of thin browsers such Mosaic, Netscape, or Internet Explorer, combined 
with the introduction of Hyper Text Mark-up Language (HTML) and Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (http)— a simple request-response protocol taking advantage of an open network— 
fueled the development and diffusion of the Internet beyond its original purpose (Lyytinen et al. 
1998, Tuomi 2002).  While the initial implementation of the Internet dealt with the relatively 
narrow technical challenges of packet switching, the success of this architecture in an open 
network later on spiraled a wave of unforeseen computing solutions, tools and methods known as 
Web-based computing.  Consequently, the second half of 1990s witnessed wide and rapid 
developments in all types of new tools, standards, protocols, and platforms for Web-based 
computing.  The innovations include standards for rendering multimedia (e.g., JPEG, MPEG, 
Real Audio, Quick Time, etc), high-level protocols for data exchange, transfer and storage (e.g., 
XML, SSL, HP’s e-speak, EbXML, or Microsoft’s E-Biz etc.), scalable and reliable web servers 
(e.g., Apache, Microsoft IIL, etc), new forms of middleware (e.g. BEA WebLogic, IBM 
Websphere, Microsoft’s IIS), application servers (e.g., BEAs Weblogic, IBM Websphere, 
Oracle’s PortaltoGo, Microsofts .NET ), and component-based software (e.g., .Net, Java Beans, 
J2EE, etc).  These innovations were triggered by and subsequently triggered new business 
opportunities that had not previously existed (Basu and Kumar 2002, Sambamurthy and Zmud 
2000, Straub and Watson 2001). New companies with radically innovative business models, 
including eBay, Amazon.com, Priceline.com, and DoubleClick, emerged, an outcome that 
necessitated high-level Web-based computing capacity. At the same time, traditional companies 
embraced Web-based computing as an integral part of their on-going business activities. 
Such developments created an unforeseen demand and competitive pressure on the 
studied firms. Interview data made it clear that software development in these firms differed 
greatly from the prior client/server and mainframe-centric computing.  As one senior developer 
said, “I know that the way that we build and integrate software is much different in this space 
than what it used to be.”  Specifically, these firms characterized development in the new 
environment as having compressed technology lifecycles that resulted from intense and diverse 
innovation in Internet computing, as indicated in new programming languages (Java, C#, J2EE), 
development tools (.NET, Coldfusion, IIS etc), and data base systems (BEA WebLogic, Oracle 
PortalToGo, IBM Websphere). They faced increased and different customer demand as observed 
in completely separate applications (e.g. portals, front-stores, mobile applications) and in the 
compressed time horizon in which they had to deliver them (from several months to several 
weeks). At the same time, they observed unprecedented levels of intense competition created by 
lavish access to venture capital, which responded to new market opportunities (as evidenced by 
the emergence of new companies and competitors in the development market). Finally, they had 
to develop new competencies and business models (i.e., content editing, communication skills, 
partnerships, cost/profit sharing practices), which had traditionally not been part of their business 
logic. 
All firms felt that their ability to monitor, identify and assimilate new technologies was 
critical to their survival in the business.  These technologies dramatically shortened the life cycle 
of a large portion of the skills and expertise they possessed.  As a result, these firms needed 
constantly explore and assimilate new technologies in order to stay ahead of the competition.  
Such constant explorations resulted in an expansion of the breadth of capabilities necessary to 
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compete successfully.  Firms did not only need to acquire more knowledge, but new types of 
knowledge that could not easily be understood within their cognitive frames.  
In the past, firms had focused primarily on honing their skills in managing software 
development processes as well as their associated technical competencies in capturing software 
requirements and designing and implementing the system. Therefore, they all followed a 
structured problem-solving approach in their software development activity. This was 
documented in a set of roles and guidelines that stated what tasks had to be carried out, in which 
sequence, with what outcomes, and by whom. Such guidelines established the backbone of 
expected organizational responses to market competition. They stated how the organization 
would execute its software delivery task and with what technological means in the market place. 
Many times the guidelines had been audited and formally documented through such certification 
processes as ISO 9000 (Peach 2002) or CMM Software capability model (Humphrey 1989) in 
order to indicate the predictability and repetitiveness of an organization’s responses to their 
clients.2  These methodologies were detailed and implied a high level of detailed routinization 
through the reliance upon stable and well-tried technological platforms. In short, these 
organizations had been well equipped to effectively exploit their certainties in the past pertaining 
to the characteristics of good software development (see also Pressman et al 1998). 
As noted in Lyytinen et al (1998), however, Web-computing embraced a radically new 
set of technological skills and other competencies that questioned many earlier capabilities and 
views the companies had valued.  Many companies were thus taken by surprise by the scope and 
speed of change in these competencies. They had to rapidly expand their exploration of new 
uncertainties, which included such diverse areas as telecommunications and component based 
software development, (multi)-media oriented graphics, content and audio-visual representation, 
process development practices that improved customers’ business processes around web-based 
service delivery, and change management that initiated organizational change in their clients. 
This rapid change of skill sets is echoed in the following quote: 
 
“[For Web-based systems] it’s typically the [specialized] front-end developers who will do the 
design.  Or there will be a specific design person.  If there’s a specific design person, that person 
might know HTML, but it’s unlikely to know JAVA.  If you have a developer, that person’s likely 
to know JAVA, but not have the best design skills.  And, obviously there is a disconnectivity 
between those two because you want your web page to look good and run fast.  And, it’s hard to 
find resources that can do both.  It’s not impossible, it’s just hard.  Again, because developers tend 
to be more logical.  They are not focused on the artist approach to what a website should look like.  
They need usually guidance.” 
 
A significantly increased breadth of knowledge also brought to the fore the criticality of 
meta-knowledge -  how to reflect upon and organize these competencies within an organization, 
how to build learning processes that provide solutions to burning questions, what to acquire, 
what to keep, and what to throw away.  Such meta-knowledge was related to the strategic thrusts 
and drivers of these firms - in what technologies and markets would they be in and need to 
compete. This change is reflected in the following quote by one business manager: 
 
                                                 
2 Three out of seven companies we studied had obtained such certificates in the past and they were regarded as 
important signs of maturity and reliability in developing software solutions.  
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“Our firm traditionally had extremely good knowledge sharing practices in place…[now we] have 
just not been able to keep up with technology and the way that technology has been spreading 
rapidly and diversifying into different subgroups.” 
 
According to another manager: 
 
 “ (I) don't have enough people yet to say that we have very good expertise on every technology 
we employ.”    
 
While these firms were rapidly expanding the breadth of capabilities, they simultaneously 
had to exploit the newly acquired skills.  To assimilate these knowledge assets faster, they 
needed to expedite the experimental processes.  For example, in firm 1, the team-leader would 
recognize when the team was deficient in a new skill and would task his subordinates with 
learning the particular skill through their own research and study   and then implement the new 
knowledge as soon as possible. 
 
“Well I mean, it’s more of a mentor thing, where [my subordinates say], ‘well you know I’m 
getting blown up on this,’ and I’ll go and look at what they’re doing and [say] you really need to 
go read up on this and here’s a book...[and these reading assignments are the equivalent of] 
tutoring on demand.” 
 
Furthermore, the firms had to apply the assets in a wider scope in order to better 
understand technology potential.  This occurred in part by learning from others and in part by 
learning from personal experience. The firms also had to internally transfer the knowledge faster 
so that problems amenable to Web computing could be formulated and solved effectively.  The 
rapid expansion of depth helped them to see what was truly novel in technologies and what could 
be reused from their prior competency bases.   
Similarly, according to one of the managers at Firm 7, they saw themselves as having two 
types of projects - one for exploiting the technology skills they had managed to disseminate 
throughout their development group and another, which was risky, but allowed for the fast 
exploration of new skill sets while simultaneously exploiting them. 
 
“[We] have like two types of projects.  Those that [utilize our well understood technologies, and 
those that] introduce new technologies in some kinds areas.  And those latter ones are highly 
exposed [i.e., risky], and for those you use your [specialized] skilled resources.  [That group] is 
the type of talent who are very good people in these technologies and you allocate these people to 
those highly exposed projects”  
 
In addition to the rapid expansion of the breadth and depth of knowledge, the companies 
experienced a rapid contraction of time horizon.  This was a result of two factors.  First, the fast 
developments in technology placed pressure on these companies to accelerate their learning 
processes. This primarily affected the speed and scope of their exploration.  Second, their clients 
demanded a radically faster delivery of solutions, which deeply affected their exploitation speeds 
and capabilities.   Companies sensed a great urgency among their clients to “get the damn system 
out” and to become the first to market.  The applications had to be turned out at “Internet speed” 
and firms had to set up dramatically shortened project targets. This happened at the same time 
when the amount of knowledge that needed to be assimilated increased.  In fact, firms’ efforts to 
expand the breadth of capabilities were caused in part by the dramatic compression of 
development timeframes and the shortened life expectancy of technical knowledge. Firms were 
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less sure how long they would require specific capabilities and how critical they would be in the 
future.  In order to deal with these uncertainties, the firms had to become more selective and 
conscious about what to keep and what to give up and quickly comprehend the potential value of 
a new capability before extensive exploitation occurred.  
Collectively, our data reveals that rapid technological change, increased pressure from 
clients and high uncertainty and ambiguity of markets resulted in hyper-learning. Firms had to 
continuously juggle the processes of exploration and exploitation in order to stay at the forefront 
of the wave of innovation. 
 
Rapid Expansion of the Breadth of Knowledge 
How do companies rapidly acquire new capabilities? Our data reveal a remarkably 
consistent pattern by which the firms we studied rapidly acquired new capabilities. While each 
firm had a slight variation in its capacity building, all firms followed the mechanisms of (a) 
distributed and active gate-keeping and (b) extended grafting of external knowledge in order to 
rapidly acquire new capabilities. 
Distributed and Active Gate-Keeping.  In the new situation, companies closely heeded the 
changing environment and allocated a large proportion of their resources to boundary spanning 
and environmental monitoring activities.  One prevalent mechanism was the active use of gate-
keepers that scanned their environment and translated technical and business information into a 
form that was comprehensible to the rest of the organization and its agenda (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). Such a gate-keeping function took several forms, but all of the firms moved this 
activity in the front line where the strategy was executed. It was also distributed and 
decentralized across a larger number (up to 80% of the organizations’ members) of 
organizations’ members than the traditional form of gate-keeping, which typically is limited to a 
small number of people in the organization.  
For example, the strategy of Firm 1 was primarily driven by the capabilities of lead 
developers who were attracted to the company’s technology jobs.  Therefore, the firm sold only 
what the developers wanted to produce and exploit, based on their exploration. For example, one 
executive said: 
 
“We use J2EE because it is considered to be the attractive technology by the elites in the 
development community.  Those are the type of people we like to hire. So, if we tried to give less 
attractive technology jobs to those people, the developers would quit… We hire good people and 
good people want good technologies. And, we go with the technologies we go with because that is 
where people want to go.” 
 
By having at least one person in the organization keep up with each of the newest 
technologies, the organization was able to place this person in the role of lead mentor in the 
development group to disseminate knowledge quickly once the technology needed to be 
exploited: 
 
“Typically, if you go into a new project and there’s new technology, [we make sure to already 
have] a few people who have [familiarized themselves with that technology] before.  [That way 
we] won’t have everybody who’s not done it.  The people who have done it would review the code 
or the work products of people who haven’t and then show them what they’re doing wrong.” 
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The firm invested heavily in off-site training for these developers in order to enable them 
to acquire new skill sets. Once they acquired these skills, they became the main drivers of the 
firm’s future services. 
Firm 2, a large global management and technology consulting firm, relied heavily on 
external sources such as open-source communities and Internet newsgroups as means of 
acquiring new knowledge. An executive of the firm observed that, “geeks in newsgroups have 
the best information and we try to piggyback on them.”  The firm encouraged all employees to 
participate in the newsgroups, but in most cases this activity relied on a cadre of “technology 
gurus” who were deeply enmeshed in the fabric of those newsgroups and could explore and 
understand new technological solutions.  The reason for this was the depth and fast pace of 
change in knowledge and its contextual nature, which required high level expertise and social 
networks to truly grasp it. 
Firm 3 had been spun off from its parent company, which focused on “traditional” 
mainframe based services.  It was spun off “because of the recognition that decisions could not 
be made fast enough in the parent corporation moving at the large company pace to meet the 
requirements of the Internet pace.” It originally started with 22 people, but quickly tripled in 
size. Since the core members of the firm came from the distributed network group, the firm had 
to quickly acquire new skills for the Web-based developments outlined above (media skills, 
business change skills, and component development based skills).  To fill this gap, the firm hired 
a new chief information officer (CIO), who had substantial experience in Web-based 
development, to infuse these developments skills to the rest of the firm and accordingly establish 
the gate-keeping capability. 
Firm 4 and Firm 5— both start-ups— focused exclusively on Web systems development 
and had similar structures due to a lack of organizational inertia and earlier cognitive framing. 
These were optimally matched with their local learning needs and strategy execution.  Both of 
them identified a small group of “experts” in specified areas and relied heavily on them to 
identify and assimilate new capabilities.  Firm 4 had “Skill Leaders,” in eight different areas who 
were responsible for “scanning environment of external technologists, the press, and 
newsgroups.” Similarly, Firm 5 maintained a list of employees who were identified as “experts.” 
They amounted to about 10% of the employees. In addition, the Human Resource department 
kept the list of employees who were interested in learning new technologies.  About 25-30% of 
employees fell into this group. The firm sent those people for training and tried to elevate them 
into experts.  Sometimes, they also recruited people to bring new technological capabilities into 
the company. For each key technology, the firm expected to have at least one to three experts. 
These experts had to share what they had learned from scanning the external environment and 
through the technology trials with the rest of the firm. Within the company, everyone knew who 
those experts were, and sought their help in addressing their technical problems. 
Firm 6, a consulting branch of a global computer hardware, software, and service 
provider used “boundary scanners,” who worked closely with the firm’s business partners.  Each 
of them was an expert in a set of selected technology areas.  Typically, the firm negotiated with 
their clients to run experiments in emerging technologies, such as mobile commerce and wireless 
services. These projects involved a higher degree of risk and the firm sometimes agreed to take 
on the project with lower profit margins. Since the firm’s employees did not have all the 
necessary capabilities and skills, it sought out the expertise of its business partners. The business 
partners kept the firm informed of what they had learned in these projects so that the firm could 
offer proven solutions later to its clients through their expert network.  The firm also utilized a 
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large global knowledge management system that was dedicated to collecting data on solutions 
that had been offered by boundary scanning business partners. 
Finally, Firm 7, a large Finnish information technology service firm, ran a separate 
technical support group for its frontline consultants. At the highest level of technical support, the 
firm had “mentors” who comprised about 1% of all employees. These mentors were experts in 
chosen technical areas. They were assigned to key pilot projects when a new technology or 
strategy was being developed and deployed for the first time. Typically, a mentor stayed with the 
project about three months before he or she moved on to the next project.  Mentors were also 
expected to bring frameworks, methods, and guidelines to the rest of the organization from their 
fields of expertise. 
In summary, all firms had active and explicit structures and processes of gate-keeping for 
identifying, monitoring and acquiring new capabilities.  These individuals were highly regarded 
in the firms for their technical skills and domain expertise and were actively recognized and 
supported by senior management.  Many times these gate-keepers were deeply immersed in the 
Internet communities, hardware and software vendor communities, and academic research 
communities where they constantly sought out  new opportunities and threats. Many firms 
strategically selected their projects in order to acquire new capabilities and placed gate-keepers 
in those projects.  Thus, active, distributed and decentralized gate-keeping seem to be a unique 
feature of organizational hyper-learning; the gate-keepers provide strategic access points in the 
“front line” to critical knowledge and competencies and thereby become the nexus of expanding 
the breadth of competencies and speeding up their exploitation. 
 
Extended Grafting of External Knowledge.  As a result of diminishing timelines and the 
introduction of several new technologies, the firms had to import a significant amount of 
knowledge from external sources by directly acquiring software components, through 
outsourcing or strategic partnerships.  Extended grafting resulted in the rapid acquisition of 
capabilities in the form of tangible resources or codified knowledge that could be easily disposed 
of when no longer needed. This strategy was followed primarily when there was no time to 
develop competencies internally, when these competencies did not fit with the strategic 
management “vision,” or when the external sourcing exposed them to a low power position due 
to resource dependencies. Sometimes extended grafting was driven by the need to keep an 
organization’s identity and its cognitive models simple and uniform. For example, older software 
companies resisted the idea of hiring graphics designers and instead outsourced graphical 
designs.  Grafting was a radical change for these firms and was adopted out of necessity to deal 
with the demands of Internet computing.  As one manager indicated, “moving towards assembly, 
it just happened overnight.” 
Because of these changes in building applications, firm 1 found that they now sought to 
purchase software components from external sources whenever they were available. At the same 
time, it no longer actively built its internal software libraries.  This was a significant change from 
the past because the firm used to develop most of the software internally and draw upon its 
internal software assets.  Although the increased technological capabilities of component based 
software3 certainly contributed to this change, the compressed development time was an 
                                                 
3 This is echoed in the idea of being able to “plug in” software components like Lego blocks into different parts of 
the software “architecture” by concealing the differences in the runtime platforms and interfaces through 
middleware “glue” like Object Request Brokers (Corba), or Distributed objects (DCOMM), see 
(http://www.omg.org/news/whitepapers/). 
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important contributing factor for this change.  An executive of Firm 1 stated the following: 
 
“We always take the fast way out.  We have often been able to buy and plug in a component faster 
than we would have been able to just spec out the requirements alone, let alone build quality 
assurance.” 
 
Further, he believed that they were going to have to drastically increase component buying from 
the currently high levels as the way to deal with increasingly shorter timelines.  As he indicated, 
“You know we have to move in that direction in order to be able to respond faster.” 
Firm 2 imported external knowledge in the form of software components as well.  It 
relied heavily on open-source communities that were monitored through their gate-keepers to 
check the new entries or changes in the community directories.  The firm also outsourced 
software development to external contractors to bring in “developers” whose skill sets the firm 
did not internally possess.  Firm 3 also experienced a significant increase in outsourcing. It 
extensively used external Java programmers after it hired its CIO to acquire the skills utilized in 
Web-based systems development.  
Firm 4 actively utilized both outsourcing and components as a way to expand the breadth 
of its knowledge.   One executive of the firm said the following: 
 
“Customers often have many parts of the project that we don’t give to them.  We outsource [web 
site] hosting and ASP [application service provider].  We purchase the platform and buy 
components.  We purchase components because we don’t have enough resources.  We don’t “do 
Web sites” and we will act as project manager for the existing clients to find a small company to 
do it.”  
 
This firm chose Finland as its location as it enabled outsourcing for the following reasons: (a) the 
firm was rapidly expanding its knowledge resources in the mobile computing area (b) Finland 
was a convenient area for recruiting people with mobile computing knowledge; and (c) Finland 
had a deep pool of local resources. 
Firm 5 was least active in grafting external knowledge. Still, its executives admitted that 
they tried to buy components when good ones were available. Along the same vein, the firm used 
outsourcing infrequently. Sometimes, when a customer wanted them to develop systems with the 
newest technologies, the firm some worked with external contractors to bring in such 
technologies. 
Firm 6 actively used outsourcing when clients required special customized developments.  
In particular, the firm extensively outsourced graphic and telecommunication designs - especially 
in its growing mobile business.  The firm also extensively purchased components when required.   
Finally, Firm 7 outsourced the areas in which they neither had strong capabilities nor saw any 
reason to expand them. Those areas included testing, graphics design, and training.  In addition, 
the firm sought to acquire other companies that possessed key strategic skills that would be 
useful in their future businesses, including mobile services, enterprise integration platforms and 
so on.  
In summary, except for Firm 5, all other firms used outsourcing and strategic alliances to 
rapidly acquire new capabilities.  Many firms purchased software components when they did not 
have time, or when they did not see the need to develop deep expertise in that area. On the 
whole, firms struggled to find a balanced and “strategic” way to graft external knowledge.  
Outsourcing, strategic alliances, and component purchasing were pursued mostly to gain access 
to capabilities where their expected lifespan was seen as short and insignificant to their core 
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strategy.   
Ironically, at the same time, the firms relied less on internal documentation and the reuse 
of their software assets. This was due to the rapid expansion of technology domains, such as 
multimedia and communications. Another factor was the fast rate of diffusion of Web solutions 
to different industries.  As a result, companies worked with many disparate industries, which 
reduced the portability of functional code.  Some of their clients also required that the delivered 
code should not be reused.  The rapid exploration cycles caused also constant information 
overload making the reuse of code less effective.  For example, Firm 5 had set up internal 
libraries for software reuse, but these were not effectively used. There were too many and 
diverse software components stored, which over time made it confusing, uncertain and 
dangerous to use the components. 
 
Rapid Expansion of the Depth of Knowledge 
How do companies in hyper-competitive environments exploit the ambiguous and 
uncertain knowledge that they have acquired and transform it into a certainty?  How do they 
deepen the knowledge and yet manage to keep abreast of rapidly changing environment?  Our 
data provides several insights into how companies accomplished this without losing their ability 
to further expand their knowledge bases.  Again, we observed the following two mechanisms 
that increased rapid exploitation: (a) the reuse of simple rules and artifacts, and (b) the building 
of peer networks. 
 
Reuse of Simple Rules and Design Artifacts.  As noted earlier, firms relied extensively on 
external knowledge sources instead of reusing of their internal code assets in order to free 
cognitive capabilities to acquire new capabilities.  At the same time, to enable the rapid 
exploitation of their codified knowledge, they pursued a new sort of artifact-based exploitation. 
Contrary to the past when the reuse of the code was internally developed, the companies were 
increasingly reusing higher-level system knowledge that pertained to the development processes 
and design patterns – a reuse which yields higher productivity gains, but requires a higher 
abstraction of task domains (Zhang and Lyytinen 2001).  
Firm 1 retained the effective development patterns from their previous projects. These 
covered both the processes and design patterns that offered boilerplates for solutions.  In 
particular, they reused templates for web pages they had developed. This resulted in a 
methodology that was dramatically simpler and favored the use of prototypical design solutions.  
The reason for this change was that the older detailed methodology did not work.  One of the 
interviewees said the following: 
 
“I did out of sheer panic.  I spent two days [at a customer site] trying to get [deliverables from 
using the old methodology] that worked and failed miserably.  It was embarrassing” (Architect, 
Firm 1).  
  
In Firm 2, patterns and processes were also highly reused.  Design patterns were made 
available in manuals that were shared over the Internet.  Many of the analysis patterns were 
developed in the headquarters and the emphasis was on the significant reuse of patterns.  This 
was a significant departure from the firm’s past practice that emphasized code reuse. 
Furthermore, the executive of the firm said that accelerated changes in technology forced them to 
loosen up their rigid development methodology, as detailed guidelines did not work. Again, this 
was a significant departure from their past practice where the firm was known to take huge pride 
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in having a well-established development methodology. 
At Firm 3, the goal was to simplify their methodology and reuse mostly functional 
business logics behind the system design.  According to one executive, 
 
“These products [web-based systems] were developed without a formalized set of methodologies.  
Current versions of software did not develop at the Internet speed.  Some took 18 to 24 months, 
which we don’t consider acceptable.  We have been “winging it” using some very basic 
methodology rules and tools to make a quality product.”  
 
Although the firm had a well formulated system development methodology it had 
inherited from the parent company, the developers argued that it did not fit with the new 
environment. Consequently, the firm had adopted a simple and informal 3-step method.  
Similarly, Firm 4 had developed a simple 3-step methodology that consisted of the “envision,” 
“shape,” and “realize” phases.  The methodology enabled the firm to reuse the development 
patterns without reusing the code over a variety of technological platforms and business 
environments. 
Developers at Firm 5 mentioned that they did not reuse the code, but reused their simple 
methodology.  Their methodology was also simpler than the traditional software engineering 
methodologies to which they were accustomed. They believed that traditional methodologies 
would be too “heavy” for the size and speed of typical Web development. Firm 6 was similar to 
Firm 2 in terms of its global scale of operations as well as its heavy reliance on an established 
methodology.   Like other firms we studied, Firm 6 had adopted an informal methodology for its 
Web systems, which reused analysis patterns.  While they reused their analysis and overall 
solution designs, they integrated them with outsourcing and external component purchasing 
practices during system implementation.   
Finally, among the firms we studied, Firm 7 most aggressively pursued code reuse and 
highly standardized development processes. However, an executive acknowledged that following 
their strict development processes was difficult and the firm had to focus on “bare essentials.” As 
a result, it was stripping off less essential aspects of the methodology.  
Overall, it is striking to note that all firms were moving away from rigid, detailed and 
standardized development methodologies that had been the pride of these companies over the 
last ten years. At the same time, they used design artifacts and simple patterns as a means of 
exploiting their knowledge assets. This resulted in radically simplified and informal development 
methodologies, which represented a sharp departure from the prevailing tradition within the 
software industry of reusing code and adhering to detailed (routinized) methodologies in order to 
successfully manage software development. Moreover, some firms had extensively used CASE 
(computer aided software engineering) tools to automate steps of their formalized development 
process.  Not surprisingly, those tools were not used any more.  This “un-bundling” was 
necessary since their methodologies did not fit with the changing environments where speed and 
change was everything.  Most technical experts and executives attributed the shift to simple 
artifact-based reuse and patterns to rapidly expanding business and technological uncertainty.  
The new technological landscape made software reuse less appealing: software vendors 
introduced tools that were not compatible with their existing code.  Rapidly expanding business 
environments made software reuse less attractive, since client requirements varied dramatically 
across different industries.  Furthermore, the shortened development times placed a tremendous 
amount of pressure on the timely completion of projects whereby the reusability of software code 
became a less important goal.  
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Building Peer Expert Networks.  The firms relied on peer networks, in order to effectively 
exploit their low-level detailed technical knowledge necessary to implementing the systems.  All 
firms used mentoring mechanisms and peer networks to share and maintain technical knowledge.  
In most cases, gatekeepers became the critical nexus of mentoring processes and thus acted as 
the key integration mechanism in interlacing the exploration with exploitation.  For example, in 
Firm 1, the top management tried to “spread the knowledge around by placing the people with 
appropriate skills sets to mentor available people who are assigned to a project.”  They also 
reviewed the software code written by others in order to share new knowledge and transfer good 
coding practices.   
Firm 2 used to rely extensively on formal training.  Traditionally they had relied on an 
elaborate system development methodology in which all new employees received 
“indoctrination” training that lasted for three weeks.  Additional CDs, technical manuals, 
technical databases, and satellite video facilitated knowledge sharing around the methodology 
and designs.  However, the firm soon realized the shortcomings of their rigid knowledge transfer 
mechanisms.  Accordingly, it started informal on-the-job mentoring in relation to Web system 
development and relied on gatekeepers to provide technical expertise in their specific areas.  
According to an executive of the firm, about 75% of people ask the gatekeepers for existing 
solutions during design tasks in order to minimize duplicate efforts.  Most often, these 
gatekeepers were contacted via e-mail.  
At the time of the study, Firm 3 was planning to implement a mentoring program under 
the leadership of a new CIO.  The firm planned explicitly to tie their employees’ promotions and 
salary increases to their mentoring activities.  Firm 4 actively used mentoring as a means of 
sharing knowledge. The firm often hired people without adequate technical background as long 
as they had a minimum amount of technical knowledge and were willing to learn on their own. 
Most training was done during the projects through mentoring and each new employee was 
assigned to a mentor. (S)he also had access to regional training programs where they met other 
people and could exchange technical and tool knowledge and solution guidelines.   
Firm 5 used “unofficial” experts to share and deepen its knowledge base during 
exploitation while simultaneously promoting experts to exploit acquired technical knowledge at 
a detailed level.  The projects of the firm had a “flat” structure, which was expected to encourage 
people to take ownership of their own areas.  As noted earlier, the firm expanded its knowledge 
base mostly by relying on experts who had to deepen their knowledge voluntarily and through 
new hired employees.  In either case, the employees who had expertise were expected to share 
their knowledge with others through mentoring. 
Firm 6 had a firm-wide training program for new hires.  It began with a conference that 
was designed to educate people before they joined the team. Each new-hire was then brought 
under the tutelage of “on-boarding personnel development managers” who acted as mentors for 
three months. After this period, new team members were released into the real team environment 
to work on real projects.  Once they were assigned to these projects, the firm assigned a local 
mentor to each new-hire for 2-4 years.  Each mentor, in turn, had 5-10 local apprentices.  
Apprentice development became part of the evaluation of the mentors’ performance.  
Finally, Firm 7 also actively used a mentoring mechanism for sharing knowledge. Once 
the exploration group understood a technology or skill set, this firm would then transfer its 
knowledge into a knowledge base.  This was a codified, three-stage process where a select group 
of “mentors” or knowledge explorers (there were approximately ten in a development group of 
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1000) first gather and then transfer knowledge to a select group of support personnel 
(approximately twenty people).  The support personnel would then take this transferred 
knowledge, enter it into a knowledge base and act as support staff for the general group at large 
(the remaining 950 people): 
 
“Mentors guide the support groups, and the support group, which can provide the FAQ [frequently 
asked questions] acts as an answering service and [provides] help for the [subsequent] projects” 
 
These mentors were put in a project long enough to transfer their expertise to one key person in 
that project.  These people later became mentors themselves after obtaining adequate technical 
depth.  According to one executive of the firm,  
 
“Projects where mentors were assigned were typically those where some new technology or 
strategy was being developed and deployed for the first time in the company.  Once the lessons 
were learned from the pilot project, the knowledge was transferred to the rest of the technical 
support organization from the mentors so that future groups working in this area would not need 
mentors.” 
 
In summary, our data reveal how firms were increasingly moving away from traditional, 
formal, and extensive training methods that relied on codified knowledge and standardized 
evaluation methods. This became particularly evident among established and large companies 
like Firms 2, 6, and 7.  These firms had used these formal training programs to “indoctrinate” 
their employees into their routine software development approach. When the companies 
recognized their limitations, they started to increasingly rely on simple rules and design artifacts 
that acted as “boundary objects” for development teams and began to offer flexible and efficient 
structuring and solution mechanisms.  These “boilerplates” could later be filled with increasingly 
varying and complex technical detail through mentoring and expert based reviews. When 
determining how to integrate and embed these highly complex and volatile technologies into 
evolving designs, they thus established social networks of mentors and apprentices. Many times, 
peer networks were integrated with organizational memory approaches like Q&A or FAQ 
databases where people could search for and discover existing mentoring knowledge that was 
partly codified through conversations or shared opinions in the network. Such knowledge often 
expanded to Internet news groups or to external peer networks in the community.   
These organic knowledge-sharing networks offered several advantages.  First, new 
capabilities could be rapidly shared with selected small groups.   Unlike traditional training 
programs, in which it takes months to prepare the training materials, mentors could quickly share 
what they know with groups of people when the technical context was adequately established. 
This knowledge could also be audited and modified through the use of collaborative and 
distributed technologies. When the companies shifted toward the use of increasingly simple rules 
and artifacts as coordinating mechanisms for development, peer networks offered a 
complementary mechanism to share and maintain detailed technical knowledge that had been 
bundled together with the routines (methodologies) in the past.  Mentoring processes were thus 
critical and necessary to rapidly sharing uncertain and detailed technical knowledge. As a result, 
the detailed technical knowledge became unbundled from the methodical routines of the 
organization and instead became the property of the socio-technical networks and the smart 
people engaged in them.   
The second advantage of mentoring was its flexibility. Unlike traditional software 
engineering knowledge transfer mechanisms where everything is embedded in a rigid 
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methodology or a CASE tool in order to ensure the consistency and predictability of the 
development processes, peer networks provided increased flexibility as to when, how and to 
what extent the knowledge was shared. This was valuable when organizations faced a high 
uncertainty of how lasting the knowledge was. Through peer networks, gatekeepers could 
quickly and adequately learn new technologies and share their knowledge with others.  
Finally, to pursue fast exploitations through the peer expert network, these firms sought 
to hire smart people and create the “aura” of an intelligent organization through hiring policies 
and incentives.  In many cases, it was more important to find a person who was excellent at 
acquiring new knowledge than it was to find someone with a specific skill set.  As a result, some 
of the most valued technologists in firm 5 came from a variety of backgrounds.  The manager 
noted the following:  
 
“Probably something more about the experts is that I think that we have more diversity in the 
backgrounds of our people…we have one biologist, one teacher, actually two teachers, one 
librarian, we used to have one journalist but he left, so they are not all just, you know, coders.”  
  
Also, an executive at Firm 1 commented that the firm intentionally hired people who could thrive 
in this environment: 
 
“We hire really good people… we believe that for something like language they can pick it up 
themselves and get some mentoring.  Now, if there was something really drastic, then we will 
probably send them for training.  Most cases they can pick it up themselves.  We can pick up 
things fairly easily.” 
 
Incentives for these experts included making their job interesting, not simply offering 
them more money.  As the owner of firm 5 said, “Money is not the issue.  I know from the 
experience that we've had, that's not everything.”  Specifically, his employees had turned down 
more money elsewhere because, “the stuff they're doing is so boring, [they were] not interested.”  
In addition, the gifted and valuable learners or “experts” were allowed to choose their own career 
path in an effort to keep them interested in staying with the company:  “[The positions they end up 
with] depends on what they wish for.  We try to take their wishes into account because all we have 
is what they have between their ears, actually.” 
Through smart people, the grafted components become a key ingredient of hyper-
learning.  “Smart” people picked up these components and “filled” them into simplified 
development patterns.  These simple design patterns that acted as cognitive platforms for agile 
development and rapid sense-making had to be complemented both with external codified 
knowledge and rapidly configured local knowledge through peer networks, both of which 
depend on smart activities.  Therefore companies tried to graft large amounts of knowledge from 
external sources, at some points exceeding the knowledge of the experts in most other firms and 
the world community.  Some of these gatekeepers found that they were among the first in the 
environment to be searching for answers to specific questions.  As the gatekeeper in firm 4 said, 
“I have found usually nobody [in his external network including Internet bulletin boards and 
throughout the international 10,000 employee network] knows answers to my questions, so that 
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During hyper-competition, organizations gain, integrate, reconfigure, and release 
capabilities to cope with unpredictable and swift changes in competition. This is accomplished 
by transforming their learning activities in a manner that is consistent with hyper-learning.  We 
began this paper with three research questions.  Our exploratory study provides answers to these 
questions. Our first research question deals with the specific learning mechanisms that 
organizations use for exploitation and exploration in order to rapidly increase the absorptive 
capacity. Our second research questions addresses how organizations configured these four 
learning mechanisms as an element of their dynamic capabilities.  Finally, our third research 
question is to identify the outcomes of hyper-learning as reflected in organizational design and 
strategy executions.  Below we will discuss our findings in light of these three questions.  
Questions 1: Learning Mechanisms for Hyper-Learning 
What were the specific learning mechanisms by which organizations rapidly increased 
their absorptive capacity?  We identified two specific mechanisms— active and strategic gate-
keeping and extended grafting of external knowledge— that were instrumental in fostering rapid 
exploration.   Likewise, we identified the reuse of simple rules and design artifacts and the 
building of peer networks as two primary mechanisms that quickened exploitation.  In both areas, 
organizations invented behaviors and processes that significantly departed from their established 
responses to learning needs.  
 
Question 2: Configuration of Hyper-Learning Mechanisms 
 All firms simultaneously engaged in exploration and exploitation. Therefore, they moved 
their technological and business expertise to the front line through the decentralized and 
distributed organization of gatekeepers.  This increased their demand for people who could think 
out of the box–those they called “smart.” At the same time, these gatekeepers became the nexus 
of fast exploitation through their position in peer networks. Another mechanism that enabled fast 
exploration was extensive grafting through codified external knowledge and skill sourcing. This 
freed additional cognitive resources for identifying and monitoring rapid movements in the 
environment.  A shift towards using simple rules and artifact-based exploitation enabled 
vicarious learning through trials and the consecutive refinement of cognitive frames that enabled 
fast exploitation.  When combined with informal knowledge transfer in peer networks, this 
resulted in the more frictionless and agile mobilization of cognitive resources.  
The simultaneous engagement in both facets of learning had temporal and structural 
implications.  Temporally, firms did not follow the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model of learning 
(Tushman and Anderson 1986).  Instead, they had to explore new technologies and at the same 
time find ways of applying them on the fly.  In line with this, firms did not create structurally 
separate units dedicated to either exploration or exploitation, but rather expanded their 
competencies in the front line by making it smarter to explore the hyper-competitive 
environment and move competencies around.   In most of the studied cases, nearly the entire 
organization was dedicated to both exploration and exploitation.   
 Another important characteristic of hyper-learning mechanisms was the reciprocal—or 
systemic—interlacing of exploration and exploitation.  Hyper-learning organizations not only 
evenly pursue exploitation and exploration, but had to deeply embed these in their social fabric. 
Exploration and exploitation therefore become dialectical moments in the rapid movement of 
technological and business innovation where gatekeepers share, create and maintain knowledge 
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to make it a certainty within months instead of years. Much of this movement is tacit in the sense 
that all the necessary technical knowledge cannot be foreseen and is not available through 
traditional knowledge sharing practices including training, documentation of procedures etc.  
 
Question 3: Outcomes of Hyper-Learning 
Another important novel characteristic of hyper-learning are its outcomes.  The resource-
based theory of the firm suggests that firms exploit the learning outcomes primarily in order to 
gain sustainable competitive advantage; they therefore need to routinize the new capabilities and 
skills so that they can be easily be replicated through the continued refinement of core 
competencies (Nelson and Winter 1982, Winter 1995, Winter and Szulanski 2001, Winter and 
Szulanski 2002).  Therefore, firms bundle key resources with other resources to minimize 
imitation by competitors (Dierickx and Cool 1989, Lippleman and Rumelt 1982, Teece 1987). 
Our analysis of hyper-learning firms challenges this wisdom.  We instead found that firms 
radically simplified their rules to enable fast movements between different competency bases 
since this was the only way possible to keep up with the pace of innovation.  Consequently, some 
of the studied firms had to abandon their previously established software development 
methodologies, which had been bundled into their CASE tools in order to replicate and refine 
their core capabilities in a larger scale, while impeding competitor imitation.  Earlier, this 
bundling had been treated as an important source of competitive advantage and a core 
competency.  However, none of the firms were pursuing such a strategy in the new situation they 
faced, but instead had largely unbundled their knowledge resources and capabilities.  
To un-bundle resources, firms had to deploy simplified rules and design patterns.  Such 
patterns represented additional high-level meta-knowledge that could correspond with the 
explosive growth of low-level detailed knowledge, which occurred as they explored new 
capabilities and tested different competency bases.  Such low-level local knowledge was 
assimilated either in the form of tacit knowledge, through socialization such as mentoring 
(Nonaka 1994) whereby it remained tacit, or integrated into the socio-technical network in the 
form of loosely organized artifacts including e-mail, short memos, or quick and dirty solution 
frames which could be quickly discarded when their value degraded.  Our results are consistent 
with earlier work that found that organizational routines in high-velocity environments tend be 
simple, experiential, and semi-structured (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  
 
Toward a Theory of Hyper-Learning 
When taken together, our results suggest a novel systemic configuration of hyper-
learning organizations, as displayed in Figure 2. As shown in the figure, critical to hyper-
learning is how and when organizations integrate specific capabilities into their repertoire and 
how they learn to quickly exploit them. The left side of the model shows rapid exploration that 
responds to the multiple learning stimuli for breadth, while its right side responds to the learning 
needs for the rapid and scalable exploitation and increasing depth. 
 A key element in the model is the dynamic interlacing of exploration and exploitation 
processes that removes the temporal and structural gaps between the two (as denoted by the two 
arrows that connect them).  Hence, in hyper-learning systems, organizations not only mobilize 
particular learning mechanisms in order to separately shift both exploration and exploitation into 
“high gear,” but they also have to accelerate cycles between exploration and exploitation through 
the tight coupling between them that results in ambidextrous learning.  In this model, the 
dynamic capability of a firm in hyper-competitive environments comes from the firm’s core 
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competency of accelerating cycles between exploration and exploitation as well as how 
effectively the four specific learning mechanisms are integrated, as shown by the dependencies 
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Figure 2. Hyper-Learning System 
 
 
When new learning stimuli arise, hyper-learning firms need to swiftly decide whether 
they require a new capability or whether it needs to deepen its existing sets of expertise.  If it 
observes a need for the new set of capabilities, then the firm needs to make swift decisions as to 
whether it will rely on their gatekeepers to explore new capabilities further, or whether it can 
import them from external sources.  The outcome of exploration is made available to the rest of 
the organization through radically simplified routines and a tight peer expert network.  This has 
significant implications for the processes that follow and how the organization will continually 
configure its resources. The resultant tacking around dynamic capability resembles the finessed 
dance of decisions observed in high velocity environments (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). 
In hyper-learning systems, specific learning mechanisms for exploitation and exploration 
do not exist on their own. Rather, they exist as components of the duality that plays out the 
dialectics of hyper-learning.  For example, active grafting and distributed gate-keeping cannot be 
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effective learning mechanisms for rapid exploration unless they shape and are shaped by simple 
patterns and peer networks for rapid exploitation. Likewise, the effectiveness of the rapid 
exploitations depends on the success of rapid explorations.  
The hyper-learning system, as depicted above, is a dramatic departure from traditional 
organizational learning models both temporally and structurally.  In traditional learning models, 
exploration functions (R&D and market research) are largely centralized in order to optimize the 
accuracy and scale of knowledge transfer from exploration to exploitation.  On the other hand, 
the exploitation function is streamlined for long term and incremental learning in order to 
support formalized knowledge transfer mechanisms.  The logic of the system is largely dictated 
by the need to find a balanced allocation between exploration and exploitation over time (March 
1991).  Thus, incremental learning and exploitation of current technology is prolonged until 
executives of the company realize the changes in technology and/or environments and make 
decisions to focus more on explorations.  From the knowledge management perspective, 
traditional organization units involved explorations that focus primarily on knowledge creation, 
while others focus on knowledge re-use and transfer. To the contrary, knowledge is constantly 
created and re-created through the dialectic interlacing of explorations and exploitations in 
hyper-learning systems.   
The shift from a traditional learning system based on punctuated equilibrium to a hyper-
learning system based on hyper-competition is thus a disruptive organizational transformation 
that requires cognitive, behavioral and structural changes.  In this sense, one element of the 
dynamic capability is the organization’s capability to transform itself from a traditional learning 





Our study contributes to the growing stream of research on dynamic capability as a 
strategic asset during hyper-competition. We explored in depth how organizations became 
ambidextrous in the simultaneous exploration and exploitation of new capabilities.  We painted a 
picture of organizational learning that is radically different from the dominating models of 
organizational learning that lean on a punctuated model of strategic capability development, 
which recognizes distinct and separate exploitation and exploration phases.  Our study 
complements and challenges many of the assumptions in the existing body of the literature in 
organizational learning.  Within the organizational learning literature, our study contributes to 
the growing body of knowledge about dynamic capability.  In particular, it provides important 
insights into how organizations quickly develop new capabilities.  This is linked to their ability 
to reduce the increasing gap between exploration and exploitation both in time and structure, 
which is achieved through their systemic interlacing.  Furthermore, we found that micro-level 
behaviors related to exploration and exploitation exhibit unique characteristics.  This finding 
offers further support to the viewpoint that dynamic capabilities are not vague or tautological 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  We can expect that there are also other mechanisms by which 
firms hyper-learn and different ways by which they reduce the gap between exploration and 
exploitation.  Therefore, future research on dynamic capabilities needs to focus on specific 
micro-level learning behaviors as well as on organizational mechanisms and technologies that 
connect learning processes in order to accelerate the innovation. 
For the knowledge management literature, our study challenges the prevalent dichotomy 
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of knowledge creation and knowledge reuse. While some scholars in this area have emphasized 
knowledge creation (Leonard-Barton 1995, Nonaka 1991, Nonaka and Konno 1998), many 
others focused on the reuse and transfer of knowledge (Argote and Ingram 2000, Davenport and 
Prusak 1998, Dixon 2000, Hansen 1999, Szulanski 2000).  We believe that while such a 
dichotomy makes sense in stable environments where firms primarily exploit knowledge that is 
created by another part of the organization, it may of limited value to analyze knowledge 
management needs in high-velocity environments. 
In terms of the software engineering and information systems development research, our 
findings point out the importance of understanding the dynamics of exploration and exploitation 
in software development innovation. This finding is in stark contrast with the current focus on 
software engineering research, which has almost solely focused on improving the exploitation 
speeds and quality in software development. The nearly religious focus on rigid methodologies 
(Lyytinen and Rose 2003, Pressman 1998), systematic process improvement programs 
(Humphrey 1989), and the “silver bullet” of automating software development (Brooks 1987) 
testify to this. Such approaches seem to be applicable only when development contingencies fall 
within cell II, where both the technologies and the problem-solution mappings are relatively 
stable. In our case, such a contingency could not be supported so organizations had to give up 
their investments in process technologies since their learning modalities did not meet the needs 
of hyper-competition. This suggests that software engineering and information systems 
development research should be more open to analyzing the implications of different learning 
modalities and environments for the development of processes, tools and methods.  
Our study has several limitations.  First of all, we observed only seven firms in a 
particular industry at a very peculiar point in time.  The specific influence of software 
development and its techniques need to be considered before drawing general conclusions from 
our study. It is important to note that software development generally contains the following 
unique features: it is abstract in nature and therefore difficult to scale up; it is very error prone; 
and it is extremely learning intensive.  Second, the frantic period of the “New Economy” 
certainly had an impact on the ways the firms operated. Thus, one might argue that these patterns 
of hyper-learning were in fact part of the Internet hype of that period, though they still are unique 
to the specific period of hyper-competition.  One needs to examine other high-velocity industries 
to find out whether what we saw in these seven firms are indeed more general patterns that can 
be found in other high-velocity environments.  We are cautiously positive that what we report 
here can be more broadly applied based on similar findings from previous studies (Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1997, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). 
Despite these limitations, our study provides important insights for companies competing 
in high-velocity environments.  Managers need to pay closer attention to the temporal and 
structural gaps between explorations and exploitations.  Their ability to manage this gap 
significantly shapes their firm’s dynamic capabilities.  Furthermore, our results suggest that 
organizations competing in high-velocity environments may need to revisit their human resource 
practices.  Incentive structure and personnel development practices might have originally been 
designed for stable environments.  
 Our research also provides several directions for future research.  First, future research 
needs to examine other hyper-competitive environments in order to validate similar 
transformations in learning patterns.  Furthermore, we might be able to find specific forms of 
hyper-learning that are idiosyncratic to specific industries.   
Second, future research needs to study the longitudinal impacts of hyper-learning.  Not 
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surprisingly, hyper-learning is intense and stressful.  It is not clear whether organizations can 
sustain such a high-level of intensity for an extended period time and what cognitive overload at 
the organizational level does for organizations. In the future, it would therefore be necessary to 
examine in more detail the evolutionary patterns of hyper-learning and the organizations that 
pursue it- for example, there is a question of whether there are t shifts toward the punctuated 
learning model and when such shifts occur, do such organizations break down easily from stress. 
Our sample included firms working at the cutting edge of innovation in the software industry at 
the early phase of diffusion.  One can ask the question that, while these companies acquire more 
capabilities and markets grow, do firms become different types of players, or do they continue to 
stay at the edge of the innovation curve? One implication of our study is the size of units 
engaged in hyper-learning. The dependency on smart people, informal networks and simple rules 
of thumb does not easily scale up. We could also see in our organization that they emphasized 
the need to find the right size for their organizational units and they were constantly struggling 
with the need to scale up or down, depending on their strategic position.  
Third, we also noticed three dilemmas that hyper-learning poses to organizations.  First, 
when organizations simultaneously pursue rapid exploration and exploitation, they have to 
sacrifice the depth of knowledge when they confront resource constraints (i.e., time, resource 
pool available). Hence, during hyper-competition, exploration will deal with newer, more radical 
and larger sets of possibilities while the exploitation deals with less rigid certainties. This implies 
higher risk and strategic vulnerability for their task execution and reduced effectiveness in 
executing their tasks.  Second, hyper-learning organizations have more limited ability to quickly 
scale up their knowledge assets by using formal transfer knowledge mechanisms. Thus, 
knowledge in hyper-learning organizations will be increasingly tacit, which is more difficult to 
transfer on a large scale, thus making their growth potential smaller.  Third, hyper-learning 
organizations must trade-off redundancy in their learning outcomes and competencies. By 
maximizing both exploration and exploitation, organizations soon face soon the limit of their 
learning capabilities. One mechanism for freeing capacity is to reduce redundancy and have less 
people know more.  This strategy, however, will make them vulnerable for easily losing critical 
knowledge and skills through hostile maneuvers by their competitors.  It is not clear how 
organizations can face these dilemmas of hyper-learning. Future research needs to examine these 
dilemmas and organizations’ varying responses to them more carefully. 
Finally, we have not addressed the issue of organizational performance- how did these 
organizational strategies and changes translate into organizational effectiveness? There are 
clearly other factors that influence organizational performance during hyper-competition, but 





The recent gloom in the economy has had its impact on the firms in the study.  Two firms 
went bankrupt even though the divisions included in the interviews had been financially 
successful.  Of the remaining five, two smaller firms have experienced a sharp drop in customer 
demand as the economy shrank drastically in 2001. They are still engaged in Internet-computing 
and see this as their future.  They also feel that the fast change is endemic to their environment. 
The remaining three firms are each part of a large parent organization and they have been able to 
continue their Internet development operations and increase them.  For each of the five surviving 
©Sprouts 2(4) pp 160-194, http://sprouts.case.edu/2002/020410.pdf 186
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/2-16
LYYTINEN, ROSE AND YOO/LEARNING IN HIGH GEAR 
 
©Sprouts 2(4) pp 160-194, http://sprouts.case.edu/2002/020410.pdf 187
firms, the direction of learning has not deviated from our observations, though the pace of 
change in the market (but not in technology) has slowed. 
The ongoing recession of 2001 and 2002 indicates that the interviews conducted in mid- 
and late 2000 occurred at a truly exceptional point in time.  In essence, we were able to capture a 
synopsis of the entire hyper-competitive phenomenon by asking interviewers to reflect on its 
impact on systems development.  While the business context now has changed, the interviews 
offer a window into understanding the hyper-competitive environment, which is triggered by 
technological change. Certainly, disruptive innovations are not singular events but more 
extensive processes, even though the particular period of our study was in many ways unique. 
Critical parameters of the technology have changed before (e.g., mainframes and client/server) 
and other periods have seen infusions of capital and research and development (e.g., electronics 
in the 1960s).   So it is likely that hyper-competition will take place again in IT industries. 
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Table 2. Firm Characteristics 
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Table 2. Firm Characteristics (continued)
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Rapid Expansion of Breadth of Knowledge Rapid Expansion of Depth of Knowledge  
 Active and Strategic 
Gatekeeping 
Active Grafting of 
External Knowledge 
Reuse of Simple Rules Building Peer Expertise 
Network 
Firm 1 Lead developers: 
• The firm only develops 
systems that the lead 
developers want to 
develop. 
• The firm invests heavily 
in off-site training of lead 
developers. 
• Active purchasing of 
software component 
libraries from external 
sources. 
• Web page templates are 
reused. 
• Place people with 
appropriate skills to 
spread knowledge around 
through mentoring 
• Mentors review code 
written by others. 
Firm 2 Technology gurus: 
• Technology geeks who 
are deeply plugged into 
external technology 
communities. 
• The firm piggybacks on 
them for new 
technologies. 
• Import external software 
code library from open-
source community. 
• Outsource contractors for 
specific areas. 
• Design and analysis 
patterns are reused. 
• Loosened up rigid 
development 
methodology. 
• The firm increasingly 
relies on informal on-the-
job mentoring. 
• Gatekeepers provide 
about 75% of technical 
inquiries. 
Firm 3 New CIO: 
• He was brought in 






• Hiring a new CIO. 
• A simple informal 3-step 
methodology is used. 
• The firm is planning to 
implement a mentoring 
program. 
Firm 4 Skill leaders: 
• There are skill leaders in 
eight key technology 
areas. 
• They are responsible for 
environmental scanning. 
• Outsourcing web hosting 
and ASP. 
• Purchasing components 
and platforms. 
• A simple 3-step 
methodology consisting 
of the envision, shape, 
and realize phases. 
• Each new employee is 
assigned to a mentor and 
a regional training 
program.  
Firm 5 Experts: 
• They are 5-10% of 
employees who are 
expected to learn new 
technology and share 
their knowledge with the 
rest of firm. 
• Minimum purchase of 
software components. 
• Limited contracting for 
the newest technologies. 
• The development 
methods for web-based 
systems are much 
simpler than the 
traditional methods. 
• Experts are expected to 
teach others through 
mentoring and informal 
workshops. 
• Projects maintain nearly 
“flat” structures in order 
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• For each key area, the 
firm had 1-3 experts.  
to leverage individual 
expertise. 
Firm 6 Boundary Scanners: 
• They specialized in 
particular technology 
areas to keep up with 
changes in technology. 
• They work closely with 
selected business 
partners in order to 
experiment with 
emerging technologies. 
• Outsourcing for custom 
code developments. 
• Extensive use of 
components. 
• Analysis and overall 
solution design patterns 
are heavily reused. 
• Each new hire is 
mentored for three 
months.  After the initial 
mentoring period, a local 
mentor will be assigned 
for 2-4 years.  
Firm 7 Mentors: 
• The top 1% of technical 
support group who assist 
frontline consultants is 
expected to become 
experts in certain areas. 
• The mentors were 
assigned to key strategic 
projects. 
• Outsourcing certain 
special areas. 
• Acquire companies 
instead of outsourcing, if 
necessary. 
• Most aggressively 
pursuing code reuse and 
formal development 
methodology. 
• However, it focuses on 
“bare essentials” of the 
methodology. 
• The firm rotates 
“mentors” around 
different projects to 






Table 3. Summary of the Findings 
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